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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Police Power-Regulation of Oleomargarine
by Prohibitory License Fee-Pennsylvania statute prohibited manufacture and sale of oleomargarine colored in imitation of yellow butter and
provided for regulation and licensing of manufacturers and vendors, of uncolored oleomargarine.- A wholesale and retail dealer brought bill in equity
attacking the validity of respective $5oo and $ioo license fees as confiscatory and unjustified under police power. Held, fees are unreasonable and
violative of Art. x, §§ i and 9 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania 2 and the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States., Flynn
v. Horst, 58 Dauphin County Reports 78 (1946), aff'd, 51 A. 2d 54 (Pa.
1947).
A legislature may impose prohibitory license fees only in those instances where'it may directly prohibit the business. 4 The U. S. Supreme
Court has upheld as not violative of due process the right of a legislature
to prohibit the sale of oleomargarine, which was not shown to be generally
wholesome, when made in imitation of yellow butter.5 Subsequently, the
Court took judicial notice of the healthful nature of oleomargarine but reinterated the right of a state "to determine as a matter of state policy
whether to permit the manufacture and sale of articles within the state or
to entirely forbid such manufacture and sale." 1 This right was later held
to extend only to those situations where it could not be shown that the
product prohibited wasinherently harmless.7 This restriction on the state's
police power was relied upon in the instant case to establish that uncolored
oleomargarine, inherently healthy, was not, therefore, subject to legislative
prohibition. 8 This premise established, the court readily disposed of the
I. Oleomargarine Act of i9oi, P. L. 327, as amended; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
1944) fit. 31, §§ 8o1-85I.
2. PA. CONST. ART. I, § I: "All men . . . have certain . . . rights, among
which are those . . . of acquiring, possessing and protecting property. . . ." § 9:
nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment
of his peers or the law of the land."
3. U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § I: ". • . nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ; . . ."
4. Rast v. Van Deman and Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342 (1916) ; Tanner v. Little, 24o
U. S. 369 (1916) ; Hammond v. Montana, 233 U. S. 331 (1914); Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59 (1912); Humes v. Fort Smith, 93 Fed. 857 (C. C. W. D. Ark.
1899) ; Indianapolis v. Bieler, 138 Ind. 30, 36 N. E. 857 (894).
5. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1888), aff'g, 114 Pa. 265 (1886);
accord, Hebe v. Shaw, 248 U. S. 297 (1919) ; Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183
U. S. 238 (19o2) ; Plumley v. Mass., I55 U. S. 461 (894).
Contra: People v. Marx,
99 N. Y. 377 (885).
6. Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, 16 (1898).
7. Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U. S. 402 (1925). A Pennsylvania statute
which prohibited the use of shoddy in the manufacture of comfortables was held invalid
since the record indicated sterilization rendered all shoddy harmless. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, with some compunction, refused to make this "then harmless" distinction in favor of an artificial food product in Carolene Products Co. v. Harter, 329
Pa. 49, 197 Atl. 627 (1938), as did the United States Supreme Court, with no compunction, in Carolena Products Co. v. U. S., 323 U. S. 18 (I944).
8. "As said in the Jelke case, . . . : 'The Powell case remains authority as to
the power of the state to prohibit the manufacture and sale of an adulterated, unhealthful, deleterious article, but now has no application to oleomargarine. . . ! " Instant
case at 87. Compare: ". . . where the possibility of evil (confusion or deception)
was not negatived, legislation prohibiting the sale of a wholesome article would not be
invalidated. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678." Carolene Products Co. v. U. S.,
323 U. S. I8, 29 (1944).
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license fees as having no reasonable relation to the amount expended to
administer the act. The court ignored or abolished the distinction formerly
recognized between commodities in commerce generally and foods. The
prohibitive power of the legislature has been given broader scope in its
regulation of food than in other health regulations. 9 In view of the cases
litigating the Filled Milk Act '0 it might be expected that oleomargarine,
though admittedly wholesome, also entails evils subjecting it to prohibition.
An artificial food, though equally nutritious, which may be confused with,
or deceptively substituted for a natural one, may be prohibited.' The subject statute comprehended the evil of deceptive substitution by requiring
licensing of hotels, restaurants, dining-rooms and boarding houses. This
aspect, however, was not discussed in the instant case. The court has limited the police power of the state to labeling alone as a means of preventing
deceptive substitution of an equally nourishing artificial food for a natural
one, even though in some circumstances the labeling affords no protection.
However, the discriminatory tenor of the subject act adds an unassayable
element. The limitation may be applicable only where it is felt that the
regulation was "passed for the welfare of the dairymen without regard to
the welfare of the balance of the people." 12
Corporations-Compensation of Officers-Power of Board of Directors to Vote Bonus-A resolution of the board of directors of
Republic Steel Corporation fixed defendant Girdler's salary as chief executive officer for the year 1940 at $175,ooo, "plus such additional amount, if
any, as the Board of Directors may determine prior to Dec. 31, 194o." The
pertinent by-law provision specified only that ". . . the compensation of
all officers shall be fixed by the Board of Directors. . . ." On Dec. 23,
i94o, the directors unanimously voted to give defendant $51,ooo as added
compensation for the year. Plaintiff, a minority shareholder, brings a representative suit, attacking, inter alia, the payment of this sum.' Held, the bonus
payment was improperly granted and is recoverable for the benefit of the
corporation. Holmes v. Republic Steel Corporation,et al., 69 N. E. 2d 396
(Ohio, Cuyahoga C. P. 1946).
Bonus payments may be legal modes of compensation, where corporate
power is found (in the by-laws for example), provided an agreement for
9. Carolene Products Co. v. U. S., 323 U. S. IS (I944) ; U. S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. I44 (1938) ; Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446 (1915) ; Purity Extract
Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192 (1912) ; Carolene Products Co. v. Harter, 329 Pa.
49, 197 At. 627 (1938). Contra: People v. Carolene Products Co., 345 Ill. i66, 177
N. E. 698 (193).

See note 7 supra.
4, 1923, 42 STAT. 1486

io. Act of March

(1923), 21 U. S. C. 6I (1940), Carolene
Products Co. v. U. S., 323 U. S. I8 (1944), U. S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S.
144 (1938). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has relied on analogy to oleomargarine
to hold legislative prohibition of filled milk, having essentially similar composition, was
valid. Carolene Products Co. v. Harter, 329 Pa. 49, 197 At. 627 (938).
ii. Carolene Products Co. v. U. S., 323 U. S. I8 (1944); U. S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. i44 (1938). The likelihood of deceptive substitution in circumstances where labeling is not a protection is probably proportionate to the illicit gain.
Filled milk is about 1o per cent cheaper than whole milk; oleomargarine is about 40 to
6o per cent. cheaper than butter.
12. See Mr. Justice Gordon, dissenting in Powell v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. 265,
298 (i886).

I. The fixed salary of $175,ooo and a pension plan affecting Girdler were both

upheld by the court In sustaining the latter, the court held defendant an "employee"
under the New Jersey statute providing for such benefits: N. 3. STAT. ANN., tit. 14,

§9-i (1939).
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such bonus has been entered into beforehand.2 The courts recognize such
plans as a legitimate method of stimulating executive initiative,3 with some
courts further attaching an economic value to the scheme.4
Although each case should be analyzed on its peculiar facts, a reading of
the cases reveals certain precepts applicable to bonus arrangements. By the
clear weight of authority, bonuses cannot be granted to officers or directors
by way of compensation for services already rendered gratuitously, or as increased compensation for services already rendered for a prescribed
amount.5 Likewise irregularities in complying with statutory and by-law
requirements may be fatal to a compensation scheme.6 A bonus plan may
meet other requirements and yet be vulnerable to attack if the compensation is unreasonable, notwithstanding ratification by a majority of shareholders.7 This principle, laid out in Rogers v. Hill," dealing with the American Tobacco Company bonus plan, places intervention on the theory that
exessive payment may reach such proportions as to constitute waste of corporate property in violation of the rights of shareholders. 9 The instant
case is conspicuous, at least, by the absence of any claim of unreasonableness or bad faith in the Girdler bonus. The court, however, found several
irregularities in the corporate conduct which it deemed sufficient to invali2. Church v. Harnit, 35 F. 2d 499 (C. C. A. 6th 1929), 16 VA. L. REv. 387 (193o) ;
Ransom Concrete Machinery Co. v. Moody, 282 Fed. 29 (C. C. A. 2d 1922) ; Putnam
v. Juvenile Shoe Co., 307 Mo. 74, 269 S. W. 593 (1925); Young v. United States
Mortgage & Trust Co., 214 N. Y. 279, io8 N. E. 418 (1915). See Dowd, Bonuses for
Corporate Officials, 86 CENT. L. J. 2o8 (1918). As regards the problems of authorization and power of directors to vote compensation to themselves as officers, bonus plans
entail the same considerations, for the most part, as do plans for ordinary compensation. Cases dealing with the latter are usually cited as controlling.
3. Cases cited note 2, supra, are indicative of this judicial attitude.
4. Harker v. Ralston Purina Co., 45 F. 2d 929 (C. C. A. 7th 1931); Booth v.
Beattie, 95 N. J. Eq. 776, 118 Atl. 257 (1924). See Magruder, Labor Copartnership
in Industry, 35 HAnv. L. REv. 91o (1922) and authorities cited in Comment, 42 YALE
L. J. 419, n. I (1933). Results of these bonus schemes have been tluestioned by Taussig and Barker, American Corporations and Their Executives, 40 Q. J. EcoN. I, 28
(1925).
See also Cohen, Corporate Bonuses and Stockholders' Rights, 14 TENN. L.

REv. 87 (1936).

5. National Loan & Investment Co. v. Rockland Co., 94 Fed. 335 (C. C. A. 8th
1899) and cases cited in 40 A. L. R. 1432 et seq. (1926). BALLANTnxE, CoQRoRATioNs
410 (,927).
6. Monmouth Investment Co. v. Means, i5I Fed. I5o (C. C. A. 8th 19o6) ; Jones
Lumber Co. v. Wisarkana Lumber Co., 125 Ark. 65, 187 S. W. io68 (1916) ; Fields v.
Victor Bldg. & Loan Co., 73 Okla. 2o7, 175 Pac. 529 (1918). See Comment, 41 YALE
L. J. 1o9, iO (1931).
7. No question of approval or ratification was raised in the present case. The
problem, present in most compensation cases, is considered in BALLANTINE, ComoRATIONS 408 (1927) and 5 FLETCHER, CycLOPEDIA OF CRo0RArioNs 421 et seq. (1931).
See Note, 46 HARV. L. REv. 828, 831, n. 25 (1933).
8. 289 U. S. 582 (1933), rev'g, 6o F. 2d 1O9 (C. C. A. 2d 1932). This case has
received wide comment in legal periodicals. See 46 HAv. L. REv. 828 (1933) ; 32
MIcH. L. REv. 672 (934); 17 MINN. L. REv. 433 (933).
For other cases where
courts have not hesitated to inquire into the reasonableness of compensation received
by corporate executives--even after approval of stockholders, see Lorillard v. Oil
Paint & Drug Co., 7o N. J. Eq. 197, 56 At. 254 (1903) ; Booth v. Beattie, 95 N. J.
Eq. 776, 118 AtI. 257 (1924) ; Sotter v. Coatesville Boiler Works, 257 Pa. 411, 101
AtI. 744 (1917).
9. This was the basis of Mr. Justice Butler's opinion in the Supreme Court. Many
courts rely on the principle enunciated by Judge Swan, dissenting, in the case below
that unreasonable payment constitutes a gift which ". . . the majority of stockholders have no right to make against the protests of the minority." Rogers v. Hill, 6o F.
2d lO9, 114 (C. C. A. 2d 1932).
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date the payment,"0 most weighty of which were the indefiniteness of the
arrangement," and the discretion it allowed the directors in ascertaining
the amount to be paid. The reasonableness of the sum, in view of the fact
that Republic had been making huge profits (21 million dollars in i94O),
might suggest a different result. And the court admits that an express predetermined plan resulting in a bonus equivalent to that paid here would be
acceptable.' 2 Initial requisite of a valid bonus arrangement then, as enunciated by this court, is a definite plan for ascertaining the amount to be paid,
formulated prior to the rendering of the services. This, coupled with the
"reasonableness" test where the plan results in an excessive sum, has apparent merit as a legal yardstick when compensation schemes are under
consideration. Weighed against possible detriment to shareholders resulting
from unrestricted bonus plans, such an approach does not appear unduly
exacting upon corporate managers, nor does it loom as an unjustifiable intereference in the internal affairs of the corporation.
Courts-Corporate Reorganization-urisdiction Over Trustee's
Plenary Suit by District Court Other Than Reorganization CourtAction by trustees appointed in a corporate reorganization under Chapter X
of the Bankruptcy Act for an accounting and recovery of corporate assets
against former directors, officers and principal stockholders. Suit was
instituted in a federal district court other than the reorganization district
without proof of diversity or other federal jurisdictional grounds. Held, the
district court had jurisdiction under § 2a of the Bankruptcy Act. The jurisdiction granted in this section is not limited to summary proceedings and
it "may be exercised by all of the district courts, and not solely by the one
in which the bankruptcy or reorganization was originally filed.":' Austrian
v. Williams, 246 C. C. H. BANKR. SERv. ff 55, 786 (C. C. A. 2d 1946).2
In order to extend federal jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings over
a new arena otherwise within the bailiwick of state tribunals the court reverted to a strained interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 3 found in
Lathrop v. Drake,4 decided in 1875. § i of that Act provided "that the
several District Courts of the United States be constituted courts of bankruptcy, and they shall have original jurisdiction in their respective districts
in all matter and proceedings in bankruptcy, and they are hereby authorIO. Payment was set aside on the basis of the following findings: (i) The directors failed to fix the compensation as required by law; (2) the amount was determined
after the services were rendered; (3) there was no contract, express or implied, for
more than $175,000; (4) there was no expectancy in defendant for more than the fixed
salary. In view of the fact that the additional compensation clause was part of the
initial salary agreement, findings (3) and (4) appear disputable. At best they are
academic conclusions which, even though correct, are secondary to the indefiniteness
of the plan.
ii.For an express written salary agreement which was not enforced because of
indefiniteness see Kinsella v. Marquette Finance Corp., 6 S. W. 2d 61g (Mo. 1929)
(but recovery allowed on quantum meruit) ; cf. Church v. Harnit, 35 F. 2d 499 (C. C.
A. 6th 1929) (indefinite bonus scheme upheld). The latter case is distinguished by the
court here chiefly on the element of estoppel, found in the fact bonuses had been paid
for 23 years under a similar agreement.
12. Instant case, p. 405.
I. Instant case, p. 58,466.
2. Austrian v. Williams, 67 F. Supp. 223 (S. D. N. Y. 1946) rev'd.
3. 14 STAT. 517 et seq. (1867). The provision relied upon was § i. After the repeal of the Act of 1867 the language of this section was incorporated in § 2 of the Act

of i898. It is now § 2a of the present Act.
4. 9i U. S. 516 (I875).
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ized to hear and adjudicate the same according to the provisions of the Act."
Justice Bradley contended that the latter clause extended to al district
courts general jurisdiction as ordinary courts of law and equity in any matter concerning bankruptcy 5-- thus including civil suits of an independent
nature which were ancillary to and in aid of the bankruptcy proceedings

where the principal bankruptcy court could not exercise jurisdiction. 6 But
subsequent courts and commentators rejected this unnatural construction
of § i and maintained that § 2 of the Act of 1867, which granted concurrent
and appellate jurisdiction to the former circuit courts, 7 was the source of
federal jurisdiction over this class of cases.8 The instant court, however,
explained that the cases so stating were merely dicta 9 because they were
decided under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898; "1 therefore they were not concerned with § i, but with the applicability of a new provision, § 23 of that
Act, which specifically limited district courts' jurisdiction to suits where
diversity or other federal grounds were present." The question of interpretation then became moot until the passage of the Chandler Act 1 2 when
§ 23 was expressly made inapplicable to a reorganization proceeding under
Chapter X. 18 The language of § i of the Act of 1867 has remained substantially unchanged as incorporated in the present Act.1 4 Consequently,
the court in reliance upon the Lathrop case concluded that this section conferred jurisdiction in the case at bar, and the reasoning of the decision is
unassailable if the doctrine of that early case is accepted. But that doctrine
was also based upon a dictum. Notwithstanding the premise stated therein
that the circuit court could entertain jurisdiction only if district courts were
extended such power, the decision itself stood for the bare proposition that
a circuitcourt had jurisdiction over the controversy.' 5 But this proposition
is supported largely by § 2 of the Act of 1867-a section not included in the
Act of 1898 nor in the present Act. The case as a precedent is thus sapped
of its jurisdictional vitality, and the strained construction of § i Q 2a of
the present Act) should not be applied, for when read as a whole, it is ap-

5. Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U. S. 516, 517-518 (1875).
6. "Proceedings ancillary to and in aid of the proceedings in bankruptcy may be
necessary in other districts where the principal court cannot exercise jurisdiction; and
it may be necessary for the assignee to institute suits in other districts for the recovery
of assets of the bankrupt. That the courts of such other districts may exercise jurisdiction in such cases would seem to be the necessary result of the general jurisdiction
conferred upon them, and it is in harmony with the scope and design of the act." Ibid.
7. The pertinent part of §2 provided: "Said circuit courts shall also have concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts of the same district of all suits at law or in
equity which may or shall be brought by the assignee in bankruptcy against any person claiming an adverse interest . . . touching any property or rights of property
of said bankrupt transferrable to or vested in such assignee." 14 STAT. 518 (1867).
8. Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U. S.524 (1899) ; Schumacher v. Beeler, 293
U. S.367 (1934) ; I COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (I4th ed. 1940) § 2.o6; 2 id. §§ 23.01-23.08.
Contra: Babbitt v. Dutcher, 216 U. S. 1o2 (igio) ; Goodall v. Tuttle, io Fed. Cas. 579
(W. D. Wis. 1872).

9. Instant case, p. 58,466.
10. 30 STAT. 545 (1898), I1 U. S. C. § 11 (I927).

The Bankruptcy Act of 1867

was entirely repealed in 1878 and until 1898 there was no national act.

ii. National Bankruptcy Act § 23 (as amended).
12. 52 STAT. 840 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § I et seq. (Supp. 1946).

13.

NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY

AcT

§ 102.

14. Id. § 2a.
I5.
-By the amendment of 1874, i8 STAT. 178, in § 2 of the 1867 Act, cited mipra
note 7, the words "the same district" were changed to read "any district" This removed all doubt as to the jurisdiction of the circuit court in the instant type of suit and
eliminated any necessity to extend the language of § I beyond its natural import in
order to confer jurisdiction upon the circuit court as Bradley did above in Lathrop v.
Drake.

RECENT CASES

1947]

parent that its clear and natural meaning refers only to strictly bankruptcy
proceedings. 6 A possible explanation for the present decision is that the
court was influenced by the same purpose and design as Justice Bradley, to
wit: "State courts may undoubtedly be resorted to . . . but a uniform
system of bankruptcy, national in its character, ought to be capable of execution in the national tribunals, without dependence upon those of the
,,
11
states .

.

International Law-Enemy Aliens-Change of Citizenship of

Non-resident Natives by Transfer of Territory-Petitioner, born in
the Sudetenland ' in 1905, came to America in 1935. The Sudetenland
was ceded by Czechoslovakia to Germany in 1938 by the terms of the Munich Pact. A subsequent treaty provided that non-residents of the area who
were of Geman stock became German nationals.2 Petitioner then applied
to the German consul for a passport, declaring for that purpose his willingness to bear arms for Germany. He was arrested in 1944 under the authority of the Enemy Alien Act 8 and has since been detained at an immigration station. In 1945 the Sudetenland returned to the control of Czechoslovakia. 4 Petitioner's writ of habeas corpus placed before the court the
problem of whether he is a "native, citizen, denizen, or subject of a hostile
country" within the meaning of the Act. Held, petition denied. Petitioner
became a German citizen in 1938 and remains one. United States ex rel.
Reichel v. Carusi, 157 F. 2d 732 (C. C. A. 3d 1946).
The Court in effect found that the cession of the Sudetenland by
Czechoslovakia afforded petitioner an option of citizenship which he exercised in favor of Germany, but that the subsequent restoration of the area
to Czechoslovakian sovereignty by the force of Allied arms did not give him
a similar option.5 A possible basis for this distinction is the difference in
form between the first and second transfers of territory. 6 The use of a
6. NATIONAL BANKRUpTcy Acr § 2a. See authorities cited supra note 8. Former
§ 2 of the Act of 1867 was never incorporated into the present Act.
17. Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U. S. 516, 5x8 (i875).
i. At that time the area was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1919, by
the Treaty of St. Germaine, it was incorporated into Czechoslovakia.
2. 1938 REICHSGEsETZBLArT 86I, § i.
3.. REv. STAT. 4067 (I918), 50 U. S. C. §21 (940). The act became operative
by the Presidential Proclamation of Dec. 8, 194, 55 STAT. 1705, 6 F. R. 6323.
4. The Potsdam Agreement seems to have recognized Czechoslovakia's present
boundaries as permanent. Report of the Tripartite Conference of Berlin Aug. 2, 45,
UNITD NATIONS YEARBOOK Art. IX, ff B.
5. Inhabitants of transferred territory who were not residents at the time of the
transfer cannot be forced to change their allegiance. See United States ex rel.
Schwarzkopf v. Uhl, 137 F. 2d 898, 9o2 (C. C. A. 2d i943). But a native of transferred territory automatically becomes a native of the acquiring nation within the meaning of the Act. United States ex rel. D'Esquiva v. Uhl, 137 F. 2d 903 (C. C. A. 2d
X943). Is this a valid distinction? See the dissenting opinion of judge Swan in the
D'Esquiva case, supra, at 907.
6. Oppenheim, while denying that subjugation or annexation (unilateral imposition of sovereignty on an area) can change the allegiance of non-residents of an area,
suggests that by appropriate provisions in a treaty of cession this change can be accomplished. I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1937) §§ 219, 240. Cited
in the instant case at 734. But the Supreme Court has held that an annexation changed
the nationality of non-residents of the area even without an election on their part
United States ex rel. Mensevich v. Tod, 264 U. S. 134 (1924). See Brown v. United
States, 5 Ct. Cl. 571 (1869). While these cases are no longer authority for a denial
of the right of election (see note 5), they do support the view that annexation is at
least as effective as cession in changing the nationality of non-residents. For the purpose of determining changes in immigration quotas, no distinction is made betVeen
cession and annexation. Immigration Act of 1924, 43 STAT. i6o, 8 U. S. C. 12 (c)
(1940).
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treaty to effectuate a transfer of territory and thus bestow on the transfer
the label of cession, however, does not in itself seem a very satisfactory basis
for endowing the Munich Pact with a legal effect which is to be denied to
the subsequent factual nullification of the same pact.7 Another factual difference in the two transfers of the Sudetenland seems more relevant to the
point at issue than the presence or absence of a treaty. Germany sought
the allegiance of the Sudeten Germans in and out of the territory; Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, has, since the return of the territory, indicated
her attitude towards them by a policy of mass expulsion." The will of the
acquiring sovereign is certainly significant in changing the status of natives
of transferred territory,9 and the treaty provision making Sudetens German
nationals 10 is important because of its nature as an expression of the
German will, not because of its nature as a special formality. The Court
was undoubtedly moved by the obvious purpose of the Act,

".

..

to

safeguard the security of the United States by apprehending and detaining
all aliens who would be likely to entertain friendly feelings to the hostile
nation.

.

.

."1

While it is not the function of a court to examine the

loyalties of any particular alien before it in these cases,' 2 it would seem
proper to take into consideration the known tendencies of the class of aliens
whose nationality is being investigated-here Sudeten Germans-in determining whether an individual alien is within the scope of the Act.

Taxation-Capital Gains and Losses-Holding Period of Partnership Interest-Taxpayer became a member of a partnerhip in
19o8. His interest fluctuated throughout the years, at no time subsequent
to 1925 falling below 13.425 per cent. On January I, 1936, his interest
was 19.05 per cent., increasing to 23.53 per cent. on July i by reason of
death of one of the partners. On January I, 1937, taxpayer sold a 3.45 per

cent. interest to incoming partners, realizing a capital gain of $99,899.98.1
In computing the proportion of gain to be taxed under § 117 (a) of the
Revenue Act of 1936,2 taxpayer reported the interest sold as having been
held for more than ten years, which would subject to tax $29,969.99. The
7. For a discussion of the unilateral nature of the Munich Pact, see TA 0RSKY,
p. 6 et seq. See also Wright, The Munich Settlement
and InternationalLaw, 33 Am. J. INT. L. 12 (939).
8. See Worsley, Mass Expudsiont, 138 NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER 271
THE CZECHOSLOVAK CAUSE,

('945).
9. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 279 (igo).
io. Note 2 supra.
Ii. See dissenting opinion, United States ex rel. D'Esquiva v. Uhl, 137 F. 2d 903,
907 (C. C. A. 2d 1943).
12. See United States ex rel. Schwarzkopf v. Uhl, 137 F. 2d 898, 900 (C. C. A.
2d 1943).

i. See Revenue Act of 1936, §:22 (a), 49 STAT. 1657 (1936).
49 STAT. 169i (936).
Section 117 (a) provides:
"In the case of a taxpayer, other than a corporation, only the following percentages of the gain or loss recognized upon the sale or exchange of a capital asset shall
be taken into account in computing net income:
"1IOO per centum if the capital asset has been held for not more than i year; 8o per
centum if the capital asset has been held for more than i year but not for more than
2 years; 6o per centum if the capital asset has been held for more than 2 years but not
for more than 5 years; 4o per centum if the capital asset has been held for more than
5 years but not for more than IO years; 30 per centum if the capital asset has been held
for more than io years." This provision first appeared as § 117 (a) of the Revenue
2.

Act of 1934, 48

STAT.

714 (1934).

Prior to this, the tax statutes had defined a capital
1921, § 2o6 (a) (6), 42

asset as one held more than two years. See Revenue Act of
STAT. 233 (1921).
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Commissioner assessed a deficiency, contending that the holding period
should be measured from the date of the partnership's acquisition of specific
assets, or, alternatively, that the interest sold had been held for less than
one year. Almost half of the firm's assets having been held for less than
one year, $81,143.24 of the gain would have been subject to tax under the
former view, while the total gain would have been taxed under the alternative contention. Upon petition to redetermine the deficiency, the Tax Court
held: (a) that the holding period was to be measured from the date of taxpayer's acquisition of his interest; (b) that this interest had been held for
more than ten years. Allan S. Lehman, 7 T. C. No. 128, Nov. 5, 1946.
Whether, as a capital asset for tax purposes, a partnership interest is
a partner's interest as co-owner of specific partnership assets, or is an aggregate of rights in these assets in addition to rights to share in profits and
surplus, is no new problem for the courts. The Court of Claims has taken
the view held by the Commissioner, supra.8 The Third 4 and Sixth5 Circuits and the Tax Court 8 have taken the latter stand, while the Second Circuit has applied this principle 7 cautiously." In discarding the idea of coownership of specific assets, the Tax Court encountered in the instant case
the problem of determining whether taxpayer had sold the interest earliest
or more recently acquired. This situation, because of the difficulty of identifying the interest with any interest acquired prior to sale, is reminiscent
of that which called forth the so-called "first in, first out rule" 9 to establish
the cost of shares of stock which cannot be identified with particular shares
purchased in the past. 10 An accurate identification of the interest was found
impossible by the Tax Court in the instant case,"- in spite of the close similarity between the relative percentages of the interest acquired and the
interest sold. Without specifically adverting to it, the court applied what
is in effect an extension of this familiar rule to the situation created by consideration of a partnership interest as an aggregate of rights. Such a rule
is valuable for its administrative convenience, 2 but it is admittedly arbi3. City Bank-Farmers Trust Co. et al. v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 98 (Ct. Cl.
739 (1943) ; cf. Craik v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 132 (Ct.

1942), 4I MIcH. L. REv.

Cl. 1940).
4. Thornley v. Commissioners, i47 F. 2d 416 (C. C. A. 3d 1945).
5. Commissioner v. Shapiro, 125 F. 2d 532 (C. C. A. 6th 142).
6. George R. McClellan, 42 B. T. A. 124 (1940), aff'd per curiam, 117 F. 2d 988
(C. C. A. 2d 1941); Dudley v. Humphrey, 32 B. T. A. 280 (1935).
7. McClellan v. Commissioner, H7 F. 2d 988 (C. C. A. 2d 1941), arfllning 42
B. T. A. 124 (i94o), sipranote 6.
8. Helvering v. Smith, 9o F. 2d 590 (C. C. A. 2d 1937) ; see Williams v. McGowan, 152 F. 2d 570, 571 (C. C. A. 2d 1945), 59 H v. L. REv. 464 (1946). For
an analysis of the competing co-ownership and entity concepts of the nature" of a
partnership, around which much of the discussion in the cases centers, see Rabldn and
Johnson, The PartnershipUnder Federal Tax Laws, 55 HARV. L. REv. 9o9, 924-933
(I942).
9. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 22 (a) -8 (relating to Revenue Act of 1936) : "If
shares of stock in a corpooration are sold from lots purchased at different dates or at
different prices and the identity of the lots can not be determined, the stock sold shall
be charged against the earliest purchases of such stock." This has been a favorite
rule of the Commissioner. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 39, where it was applied to
the Revenue Act of 1918, and U. S. Treas. Reg. iii, Art. 29.22 (a)-8, as applied to
the Internal Revenue Code ('939).
lo. Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U. S. 123 (1935); Curtis v. Helvering, ioi F. 2d
40 (C. C. A. 2d 1939).
ii. Instant case at 25,354, 6 CCH 1946 T. C. DEc., Dec. 15,457.
12. George Vawter, 31 B. T. A. 884, 886 (1934), aff'd, 83 F. 2d ii (C. C. A. ioth
1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 578 (1936).
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trary, 18 and has been discarded where identification is at all possible 14 and
in cases of reorganization. 15 The application of a like rule should not be
resorted to in determinations such as those of the instant case for the sake
of mere convenience if it does not comport with the purposes of the holding
period provisions of the statutes, such provisions having recognized a distinction between speculative and investment capital 8 in order to prevent
the imposition of high surtax rates upon the latter with their consequent
discouragement of "normal" business transactions.1 7, When the recent acquisition of the partnership interest has occurred in a factual situation in which
speculative qualities are absent, as seems clearly presented by the principal
case, a rule of "first in, first out" is well applied."'
Torts-Right of Privacy-New York Civil Rights Law-Plaintiff
alleged that defendant portrayed events in plaintiff's life in the novel and
play-script, "A Bell for Adano." In an action based in part on § 51 of the
New York Civil Rights Law, which gives a cause of action for damages to
"any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade" without his written consent,' held that recovery will not be allowed for a word portrayal alone, in
the absence of naming plaintiff. The scope of the statute is confined to the
13. See Keeler v. Commissioner, 86 F. 2d 265, 266 (C. C. A. 8th 1936), cert.
denied, 300 U. S. 673 (1937).
14. Bloch v. Commissioner, 148 F. 2d 452 (C. C. A. 9th 1945) ; Rule v. Commissioner, 127 F. 2d 979 (C. C. A. ioth 1942).
15. Arrot v.. Commissioner, 136 F. 2d 449 (C. C. A. 3d ig43); Commissioner
v. Von Gunten, 76 F. 2d 670 (C. C. A. 6th 1935) (applying an average cost rule in
lieu of the rule of "first in, first out").
16. See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103, io6 (1932) (referring to provisions
similar to those of Revenue Act of 1921, cited smpra note 2 the first attempt to differentiate between the treatment given ordinary income and that given to gains from
investment capital).
17. See SEN. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (I934), 1939-1 (2) CUM. BULL.
586, 594; H. R. REP. NO. 350, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. (921),

1939-I (2) CuM. BULL.

168, 176. Revenue acts subsequent to the one under consideration in the instant case
have clearly recognized this distinction by a division of capital gains into long-term and
short-term capital gains. See Revenue Act of 1938, § 117 (a) (2), (4), 52 STAT. 500
(1938), INT. REV. ConE, § 117 (a) (2), (4) (939), and the report of the Committee
on Ways and Means accompanying the House Bill, H. R. REP. No. 186o, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1938), 1939-1 (2) Cum. BULL. 728, 732. Compare with this, Revenue Act
of i942, § i5o (a) (I), s6 STAT. 843 (942).
18. Harlan, J., dissented, Opper, J., concurring, on the ground that the death of
the partner on May i6, 1936, destroyed the partnership, so that taxpayer's entire interest was an interest in a new partnership and therefore held less than one year, citing
§ 62 of Partnership Law of New York, CoNsoL. LAws OF N. Y. ANN. (McKinney,
1923) bk. 38, § 6z. But compare with this; §8 6o and 6I of the same statute. See Rabkin and Johnson, supra note 8, at 935. Such drastic tax consequences seem scarcely
warranted by a conceptual view of the existence or non-existence of a partnership
effected by a partner's death when consideration is given to the business fact of a continuation of partnership affairs without change. With the dissenting opinion, compare
Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U. S. 271 (938).
i. § 5i also provides for equitable action to prevent and restrain the unauthorized
use of plaintiff's "name, portrait or picture." § 5o makes violation of the right a misdemeanor. N. Y. Laws 1903, c. 132, amended by N. Y. Laws 1921, c. 501, CONSOL.
LAws OF NEw YoRK ANN. (McKinney, 1946) Bk. 8, §0 50 and 5I. For a discussion
of this statute see Note, 9 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 159 (934).
Two other states have enacted similar statutes. VA. CODE ANN. (i942) § 5782 and UTAH CODE ANN. (1943)
tit. 103, c. 4, § 7-9. The New York statute was held constitutional in Rhodes v.
Sperry, 193 N. Y. 223, 85 N. E. 1097, aff'g, 12o App. Div. 896, 105 N. Y. Supp. ii4o
(ist Dep't i9o8) and aff'd, 220 U. S. 502 (i91o). For comment on an attempt to pass
a similar statute in California, see 13 So. CALIF. L. REv. 8I (I939).
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ordinary meaning of "name, portrait or picture." Toscaui v. Hersey, 271
App. Div. 445, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 814 (Ist Dep't 1946).
The right of privacy' was rejected as a common law right in New
York in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.' In response to reaction
against that decision the legislature passed §§ 5o and 51 of the Civil Rights
Law. As it has developed under this statute, the right of privacy is circumscribed by narrower and more inflexible limits 4 than in jurisdictions
that have accepted it as a part of their common law. 5 Most controversies
have centered around the trade and advertising provisions of the statute.
The public good served by certain legitimate types of publicity has been
recognized in decisions exempting from the statutory scope of "trade purposes" current news events or educational material in newspapers and
newsreels, magazine articles or books. Advertisements of such presentations receive the same immunity." However, use of actual names in a fictionalized version of news takes away its immunity, 7 unless the unauthorized use is very incidental to the whole narration." "Portrait" has been
intepreted to include portrayal by an actor in a moving picture where such
representation was identifiable by use of plaintiff's real name, that is, name
and portrait occurred in conjunction." Such a situation is to be distinguished from that in the instant case, where no specific indentification of
the plaintiff by name was found. Query, however, whether the movie version might not be interpreted as falling within the statutory scope of "portrait," even in the absence of naming plaintiff.10 The interpretation of
"name" in the instant case as the sole criterion of identification illustrates
the restrictive nature of the statute. If the court were confronted with a
2. For highlights in the development of the law of privacy see Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy,4 HARv.L. Rzv. 193 (i89o) ; Nizer, The Right of Privacy,
a Half-Century's Development, 39 MIcH. L. Rav. 526 (1941).
3. 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (19o3). The court in that case was largely moved
by the feeling that upholding the action would set too broad a precedent, and indicated
that a statute could give the right where it was required without extending it too far.
For an analysis of prior New York decisions, see Kacedan, The Right of Privacy, 12
B. U. L. Rav. 6oo (1932).
4. The strict construction rule of penal statutes is invoked in its interpretation.
People, on complaint of Stern v. Robert R. McBride & Co., I59 Misc. 5, 288 N. Y.
Supp. 5O (N. Y. City Ct. 1936).
5. At least a dozen jurisdictions have recognized the right of privacy as a part of
their common law. The leading case, Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga.
,9o, 50 S. E. 68 (igo5), indicates the broad foundation of the right. In Pennsylvania
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Maxey, in Waring v. WDAS, 327 Pa. 433, 194
Atl. 63r (1937), gives unequivocal recognition of the right, but the majority of the
court based its decision on a property concept. A clear recognition is to be found as
the basis of decision in Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (1940).
6. Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776, 295 N. Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937)
(newspaper); Sweenek v. Pathe News, 16 F. Supp. 746 (E. D. N. Y. 1936) (newsreel); Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. Supp. 752
(ist Dep't ig9g) (immunity for advertisements of privileged presentations). Cf. Molony v. Boy Comics Publ., 65 N. Y. S. 2d 173 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (comic cartoons relating to current events distinguished from magazine and newspaper articles of an educational nature). For an indication of the far-reaching effects of the public interest
factor, see Sidis v. F-R Publ. Corp., 113 F. 2d So6 (C. C. A. 2d 1940).
7. Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 21o N. Y. 5I, lO3 N. E. iio8 (1913).
8. See Damron v. Doubleday, Doran & Co., 226 App. Div. 796, 234 N. Y. Supp.
773 (xst Dep't 1929).
9. Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 21o N. Y. 51, 103 N. E. iio8 (1913). At
57, 1O3 N. E. at iiio, the court said, "A picture within the meaning of the statute is
not necessarily a photograph of the living person, but includes any representation of
such person."
jo. See Levey v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 57 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. N. Y. 1944), where
it is intimated that although plaintiff's name were not used, if the representation clearly
paralleled her life, there might be a basis for recovery.
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clearly identifiable and flagrant exploitation of the plaintiff's personality in
fiction, but with simple substitutions in place of his name, a remedy in libel
might not be available, 1 yet an unwarranted and offensive invasion of his
privacy might have been effected. The dissent, which gives a broader range
to the statute so as to include a word portrait, seems to be in line with the
more liberal trends of the common law right. It leaves to the jury the task
of weighing the social values of public interest and literary license against
the plaintiff's interest in personal inviolability, provided a sufficiently identifiable representation of the plaintiff has been made out.' 2

Unemployment Compensation-Refusal of Suitable Work Without Good Cause-Effect of Union Expulsion Rule-An unemployed
member of a labor union filed a claim for benefits under the Pennsylvania
Unemployment Compensation Law.- Claimant was thereupon referred to
a non-union job which he refused because, in accordance with union by-law
provisions, acceptance would have resulted in expulsion from his union
and loss of a thirty-year accrual of numerous membership benefits. Held,
compensation denied. A refusal of suitable work 2 in order to avoid expulsion from a union is a refusal without good cause. Barclay White Co. v.
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 5o A. 2d 336 (Pa. 1947).

This case marks the first determination by a court of last resort of the
effect of the good cause provision s where the claimant is confronted
with expulsion from his union. There are, however, many decisions on the
question by administrative review boards, a few of which are in accord
with the holding in the instant case, 4 all conceding, as does the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, that good cause was intended to cover situations
peculiarly personal to the particular claimant. 5 But the fundamental purpose of the legislation is to foster economic security by mitigating the disii.Beecher v. Press Publ. Co., 6o App. Div. 536, 69 N. Y. Supji. 895 (2d Dep't
i9oi) (truth may be a defense to libel in a civil action).
12. See Swacker v. Wright, 154 Misc. 822, 277 N. Y. Supp. 296 (Sup. Ct. 1935)
(equivocal identification).
i. Act of 1936, Dec. 5,P. L. (1937) 2897, as amended through 1945, PA. STAT.
ANN. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, c. 14.
2. "'Suitable work' means all work which the employee is capable of performing,
except work in which . . . (3) as a condition of being employed, the employee
would be required to join a company union, or to resign from, or refrain from joining,
any bona fide labor organization." Section 4 (r) of the UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATiON LAW, 1936, Dec. 5, P. L. (1937) 2897, as amended 1943, May 27, P. L. 717, PA.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, § 753 (r). The suitability of the work offered
was not in issue in the instant case. All parties and the Court accepted the interpretation laid down in Bigger v. Unemployment Commission, 46 A. 2d 137 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1946), and in Chambers v. Owens-A. K. Co., 146 Ohio St. 559, 67 N. E. 2d 439
(1946), namely that the phrase "as a condition of Jbeing employed" refers to a condition imposed by the prospective employer, and not one resulting from acceptance of employment because of union rules.
3. "An employee shall be ineligible for compensation or waiting period credit for
any week-(a) In which his unemployment is due to failure without good cause . . .
to accept suitable work when offered to him by the unemployment office. . . ." Section 402 (a) of the UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAW, 1936, Dec. 5, P. L. (1937)
2897, as amended 1943, May 21, P. L. 337, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43,

§ 802.

4. I0333-Ind. R. BEN. SEP. Vol. 9,No. 3 (1945) ; Graham v. Department of Employment Security, Case 44-C-66, Ind. Comm. of Utah.

5.See instant case, 5o A. 2d 336, 340, 6 (947) ; 3 C. C. H. UNEMP. INS. SERV.,
.But see 94 U. or PA. L. Rxv. 442 (1946) passim.

Ind. 1 1965.087 (1944).
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astrous effects of involuntary unemployment, and this must not be destroyed by the interpretation given to the good cause provision.7 The
Court's premise is that the claimant has joined his union voluntarily (oblivious of the fact that ofttimes a worker joins a union only because a union
card is a sine qua non of getting or keeping a job). The possibility of expulsion, as provided in the union by-laws, is, therefore, a self-assumed risk,
and any unemployment resulting from claimant's desire to avoid the consequences of that risk is necessarily voluntary unemployment and not compensable. A concept of volition so purely mechanical seems to ignore economic reality. In the light of widespread legislation designed to foster
unionism and encourage membership," it would appear inconsistent to construe an unemployment insurance statute in such a way as to force an individual onto the horns of a dilemma. The alternatives of a non-union job
and loss of union membership and benefits on the one hand, and no job at
all on the other, can hardly be said to afford a free choice. Either alternative places the worker in an economically hazardous position.9 Awarding
compensation to an individual who fails to take a non-union job under such
circumstances would seem to be in conformity with the purpose of the Act.10
But the question of involuntary unemployment notwithstanding, good cause
was construed narrowly in deference to the fear that a broader construction
would grant the unions a mandate to set the standards justifying a refusal
of referred employment, normally a governmental function. The Court's
decision, on this basis, is compelling. Yet, its fear would be obviated by
finding good cause and granting unemployment
benefits only where the
12
union rule is reasonable 11 and not arbitrary.

Workmen's Compensation-Exclusiveness of Statutory Remedy
Where Injury Caused by "Wantonness" of Employer-Tort action by
husband for wrongful death of wife employed in defendant's poultry-packing
6. U NEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAW OF 1936, Dec. 5, P. L. (1937) 2897, as
amended, Art. I, § 3, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, § 752.
7. For a discussion of this proposition see instant case, 5o A. 2d 336, 340, f 7
(1947).
8. "It is thus the settled policy of the state to encourage unions, to throw around
them the protection of law, and the maintenance of their membership has become a
matter of direct conbern to the public welfare. . . . So, an employee who joins and
abides by its internal polity is within his legal rights; and he acquires a status for the
preservation of which the police power of the state is pledged." Opinion of the Superior Court in the instant case, adopted by Mr. Justice Jones of the Supreme Court
in his dissent, 159 Pa. Super. 94, 46 A. 2d 598 (1946).
9."There can be little doubt that loss of status in his union and the attendant consequences will be a substantial harm to him and thus a sufficiently good cause for his
refusal." Menard, Refusal of Suitable Work, 55 YALE L. J. 134, 143 (,945).
io. Most review boards have held that a claimant refuses a job with good cause
when he does so in order to avoid expulsion from his union: e. 9., 3 C. C. H. UNEmp.
INS. SmV., Calif.
1965.699 (1944); 9o49-Ill. R. BEN. Sza. Vol. 8, No. 1 (1944) ; 3
C. C. H. UNEMP. INS. SERv., Mass. 118125.13; 10735-Mich. R. BEN. SER. Vol. 9,No. 8
(1946) (Claimant has good cause if he has a mere "honest and reasonable belief" that
he will be expelled); 3 C. C. H. UNEMP. INS. Sv., Md. 8o69 (1944) ; 9004-N. Y.
R. BEN. Sm. Vol. 7, No. 12 (1944) ; 8283-N. C. P_ BEN. Sm. Vol. 6, No. 12 (943) ; 5
C. C. H. UNEmP. INS. SERv., Okla. 118049.21 (i945).
ii. "Claimant is justified in refusing the position which would jeopardize his
standing in his union provided his union rules are reasonable in the application." 9049Ill. R. BEN. Sm. Vol. 8, No. i (1944).
12. "However, such arbitrary rulings of the local union . . . do not .
make her eligible for . . . benefits because she abides by the union's ruling." 8578Ill. R. BEN. Sr.Vol. 7, No. 6 (1944).
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plant. Wife was electrocuted at work by a short-circuit in a feather-picking machine, which the employer knew was defective and which was installed in violation of a local safety ordinance. Held, action for wrongful
death will not lie; death was "by accident I arising out of and in the course
of employinent" 2 within the purview of the Kansas Workmen's Compensation Act, which is the exclusively remedy.3 Duncan v. Perry Packing Co.,
162 Kan. 79, 174 P. 2d 78 (1946).

This case presents the dilemma of the surviving husband, who formerly might have recovered for loss of his wife's services under the common law extended by the wrongful death statutes, 4 but who now is limited
exclusively to a remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act which
provides only limited medical and burial expenses.5 The husband in the
instant case attempted to solve this dilemma by establishing that the wife's
death was not "by accident", and so not covered by the act, because it was
occasioned by neglect of the employer amounting to "wantonness" and
equivalent to intentional misconduct.6 Although "by accident" has generally been considered from the employee's viewpoint alone,7 and thus has
been held to include intentional injuries inflicted by both fellow-employees "
and third parties, 9 an exception has been made where the employer himself
intentionally injures the employee. Here the courts in some states allow
a common law action,'0 while in others the legislatures achieve a similar
I. Usually defined as undesigned, unexpected, and of an afflictive and violent
nature. Gilliland v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., 104 Kan. 771, I8o Pac.
793 ('gig) ; Lacey v. Washburn & Williams Co., 309 Pa. 574, 164 At. 724 (1933);
Fenton v. Thorley, 89 L. T. R. 314 (H. L. 19o3).

2. Usually defined as requiring merely "a causal connection between the injury and
the business in which he [employer] employs the latter [employee] . . . substantially contributory though it need not be the sole or proximate cause." Cudahy Packing Co. of Neb. v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418, 423, 424 (1923) ; Pierce v. Provident
Clothing & Supply Co., Ltd., i K. B. 997 (igii) ; Horovitz, Modern Trends in Workmenes Compensation, 21 IND. L. J. 473, 498 (1946).
3. KAN. GEN. STAT. §§ 44-501, 44-510 (3) (26) (1935). Today workmen's compensation acts are in force in all states but Mississippi. Horovitz, supra note 2, at 476.
Like Kansas, all the acts are exclusive, except New Hampshire which allows election
of remedy after injury. i ScHNErDER, WomExaxN's CO mpExSATION § 90 (3d ed. 1941).
All but four require that injury or death be accidental. "4id.§ 1240-a.
4. PaossER, ToRTs §§ io2, 103 (194i).
5. The Kansas act limits compensation for death without dependents to a maximum of $750 for medical expenses and $,5o burial expenses. KaN. GErN. STAr.
§§ 44-510 (2-b), 44-513 (1935). Appellant's abstract indicates plaintiff was not in
fact dependent upon his wife.
6. For classic view of when negligence becomes equivalent to intentional misconduct see Mercer v. Corbin, 117 Ind. 450, 2o N. E. 132 (1889). For modern approach see RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §§ 13, comment d, 282, comment d (1934).
7. Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workme's Compensation Acts, 25
HARv. L. REV. 328, 340 (1912) ; Horovitz, szpra note 2, at 498.
8. Earley-Stratton Co. v. Rollison, 156 Tenn. 256, 300 S. W. 569 (1927) ; Inland
Steel Co. v. Flannery, 88 Ind. App. 347, 163 N. E. 841 (1928) ; McLaughlin v. Thompson, Boland & Lee, 72 Ga. App. 564, 34 S. E. 2d 562 (1945).
9. Stark v. Wilson, 114 Kan. 459, 219 Pac. 507 (1923) ; Campbell v. Borough of
Oakmont, 157 Pa. Super. 283, 43 A. 2d 237 (I945) ; Gyas v. Hotel Bentley, 157 La.
1030, 103 So. 303 (1924).

io. Boek v. Wong Hing, 18o Minn.470, 231 N. W. 233 (930) ; Rumbolo v. Erb,
19 N. J. Misc. 311, 20 A. 2d 54 (C. P. 1941); DeCoigne v. Ludlum Steel Co., 251
App. Div. 662, 297 N. Y. Supp. 636 (3d Dep't 1937); see dictum in Adams v. Iten
Biscuit Co., 63 Okla. 52, 6o, 162 Pac. 938, 945 (1917); distinguish Pawnee Ice Cream
Co. v. Price, 164 Okla. 120, 23 P. 2d 168 (933).
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effect by special provisions in their acts.11 The distinction is evidently
made in order to punish the highly culpable employer by assessing damages greater than the generally limited compensation of the acts.' 2 Since
the decisions, however, emphasize that intentional misconduct requires design and premeditation, 3 the instant case did not appear to come under the
exception. Moreover, extending the exception for intentional misconduct
to include "wantonness" seems unwise, as it would only add to the difficulties the courts are already experiencing in deciding whether conduct is intentional or merely negligent. 14 If the courts extended the rule, the entire
category of "wanton" injuries would be excluded from compensability under the act,' 5 thereby subjecting the injured employee or his survivor to the
risk 16 of a common law action. Such was not the intent of workmen's compensation legislation, which attempted to remedy the evil of uncompensated
industrial injury by providing a sure remedy based on the employer's absolute liability.'7 If the compensation for the surviving husband under the
act is inadequate it should be increased; and if the employer's culpability
makes punitive damages desirable it is suggested the acts be amended to
impose penalties.
ii. Oregon, Washington, and West Virginia provide specifically in their acts that
where an injury is deliberately inflicted by the employer the employee may bring a
common law action over and above his recovery under the act. OE. CoDE ANN. § 1828
(1930) ; WASH. REv. STAT. tit 50, § 768o (Remington, 1932); W. VA. CODE AxN.
§ 2527 (Michie, 1943). Texas awards "exemplary damages." TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
tit. I30, art. 8306, § 5 (Vernon, 1925). California allows a fifty per cent. increase in
compensation. CAL. GENT. LAW: Act 4749, § 6 (b) (Deering, 1941). New Hampshire
allows election of remedy after injury. N. H. REv. LAWS C. 216, § 1I (1942).
12. Noted and commented upon rather propheticallly in Bohlen, supra note 7, at
333.
13. United States Zinc Co. v. Ross, 87 Okla. 21,
208 Pac. 805 (1922) (injury
caused by defective nachine known to employer not intentional because undesigned) ;
Allen v. Raleigh-Wyoming Mining Co., 117 W. Va. 631, i86 S. E. 612 (1936) (gross
negligence not enough) ; Delthony v. Standard Furniture Co., ii Wash. 298, 2o5 Pac.
379 (1922) (knowledge boiler was defective does not amount to intent) ; Jenkins v.
Carman Mfg. Co., 79 Ore. 448, 155 Pac. 7o3 (1916) (gross carelessness not enough).
14. See cases cited supra note 13.
15. Unless the exclusive nature of the act is broken down by amending the acts,
as has been done for intentional misconduct in some states (Ore., Wash., W. Va.),
and completely in another (N. H.). See spranote ii.
16. It is variously estimated that, prior to the widespread passing of workmen's
compensation legislation, 70 to 8o per cent. of the industrial injuries and deaths went
uncompensated at common law, either because of absence of fault, or the employer's
three strong defenses-contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and fellowservant. I SCHNEIDEn, WORKMEN'S C010ENSATION § I (2d ed. 1932) ; Horovitz, supra
note 2, at 475.
op. cit. supra note I6, § i.
17. Bohlen, supra note 7, at 540; Horovitz, supra note 2, at 477, 478; Schneider,

